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Developing countries that export a single  major commodity subject
to considerable price instability can even out temporary fluctua-
tions in export prices by setting up compensation  arrangements that
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Sharp fluctuations in the export prices of a major  *  Holding down government spending when
stanle commodity have three jarring effects on  export earnings are high (since the spending
economic activity. First, price hikes in a boom-  programs may not be reversible).
ing sector lead to a deterioration in the position
of other exporters as resources are redirected to  * Reining in inflation to prevent a wage-price
the desired sector and shortages emerge - spiral.
and falling prices in a sagging sector affect
other, unrelated exports. Second, governments  Chile and Cameroon have set up such
tend tc spend additional revenue generated  arrangements. In Chile the aim was to avoid
during the boom and to keep on spending even  currency appreciation in the event of temporary
after prices fall. Third, the export surge gener-  increases in copper prices. In Cameroon, the
ates a domestic expansion, bumping up against  government has repatriated only part of ffie oil
production limits that bring on inflation and, if a  earnings, and included only some of these
reversal occurs, unemployment.  revenues in the briget.
To reduce the effects of highly unstable  Compensation schemes will work in other
commodity prices and increase the government's  developing countries whose major export is a
share in the proceeds of the booming sector,  staple commodity, subject to sharp price fluctua-
developing countries can funnel the revenue  tions, and which accounts for a large share of
from higher export earnings into a special  gross domestic product. In this way, the ex-
compensation fund. The fund works like this: By  change rate, the money supply, and the budget
setting up a variable export levy somewhere  will be unaffected.
between the actual export price and an agreed-
upon base, the govemment appropriates the  This paper is a product of the Office of the
windfall revenues. In a downturn, the fund pays  Vice President, Development Economics.
producers the base price.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
The fund is set up to handle these transac-  Please contact Normal Campbell, room S9047,
tions outside the budget. This has the effect of:  extension 33769.
* Limiting price changes between domestic
and imported goods.
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TEMPORARY  WINDFALLS  AND  COMPENSATION  ARRANGEMENTS
Bela  Balassa
Introduction
Webster's New  Collegiate Dictionary defines a  windfall as  "an
unexpected  or sudden  gain or advantage." This definition  includes  windfalls
of a permanent  as well as of a temporary  character.  In the interrational
trade context,  the former  has been the subject  of a growing  literature  on
Dutch  disease,  so  named  after  the  adverse  economic  effects  of gas  discoveries
on other traded sectors  in the Netherlands;  the latter  is relevant  for the
establishment  of compensation  arrangements  to  even  out  temporary  fluctuations.
The aim of the compensation  fund established  under a World Bank
structural  adjustment  loan  to Chile  in 1985  has  been  to avoid  the  appreciation
of the real exchange  rate in the event of temporary  increases  in copper
prices.  In Cameroon,  only part of oil earnings  have been repatriated  since
1980  and only part  of repatriated  earnings  have been included  in the  budget,
so  as to limit  pressures  to increase  government  expenditures.
In the following,  the  expression  "compensation  arrangements"  will be
used to encompass  such schemes  serving  macroeconomic  objectives. The paper
will  examine  the  case  for  establishing  compensa.lon  arrangements  and  the  forms
they may  take.  As  an  introduction  to  the  discussion,  considerations
introduced  in regard  to permanent  and temporary  windfalls  will be reviewed,
followed  by a  brief analysis  of the experience  of several  countries  with
temporary  windfalls.- 2-
Permanent  vs.  Temporary  Windfall
In an excellent  review  article  on the  Dutch  disease,  Corden  suggests
that  expansion  in the  booming  sector  (B)  may  come  about  in several  ways;
"(1)  There  has  been  a once-for-all  exogenous  technical  improvement  in
B, represented  by a favorable  shift  in the  productior  function,
this  improvement  being  confined  to the  country  concerned.
(2)  There has  been a  windfall discovery of new resources (i.e.
increase  in supply  of the  specific  factor).
(3)  B produces  only for  export,  with  no sales  at home,  and  there  has
been  an exogenous  rise in the  price  of its  product  on the  world
market  relative  to the  price  of imports"  (1984,  p. 360).
While Corden concentrates  on  (1), all tb-ee changes represent  a
permanent  shift,  even if under (3) domestic  sales  are introduced  as Corden
subsequently  does.  While a  short reference  is made to  t  -rary  changes,
Corden  concentrates  on permanent  changes  as does the  Dutch  dL"-de literature
in general.
This literature  makes  a distinction  between  a spending  effect  and a
resource  movement  effect. The former  arises  as some  of the  extra  income  of B
is spent  on non-traded  goods  whose prices  will rise relative  to tradeables,
the prices  of which are determined  in the world market, leading  to a real
appreciation.  The  latter  arises  as the  booming  sector  uses  resources  that  are
mobile  within  the economy.  There  will now be resource  flows  to the booming
sector  from the other tradeable  sectors  as well as from  non-traded  sectors,
when the  effects  on the exchange  rate will depend  on the  relative  magnitudes
of these  flows.
Assume  instead  that the shift  is considered  temporary. Now, "in a
static,  one sector  economy,  with no government  controls,  long  time horizons,
and perfect markets for goods and factors ...  a  rational  economic  agent
experiencing  of windfall gain will save (invest) it all to enhance his- 3 -
permanent  income;  incremental  consumption  is confined  to  what  can  be sustained
from this enhanced  permanent  income"  (Bevan,  Collier,  and Cunning,  1987,  p.
481).
Movements in  relative prices will  re-emerge, however, once  we
introduce non-traded goods, leading to  changes in  real exchange rates,
although  these  movements  are mitigated if foreign  assets  can be purchased.
In particular,  to the  extent  that investment  goods  are  non-traded,  there  will
be an increase  in  non-traded  goods  prices  as increased  investments  take  place.
The outcome will further be affected  by the distribution  of the
proceeds  of the  windfall.  Part of the proceeds  may accrue  to the  government
(in  the form of export  and other  taxes)  and to commodity  organizations,  such
as stabilization  funds  and  marketing  boards. The commodity  organizations,  in
turn, may  transfer some of  the  incremental  financial resources to  the
government.
The g  rernment  may also take action to increase  its share in the
proceeds  of the windfall,  by e.g. raising  export  tax rates.  Its spending
decisions,  too,  will have  considerable  importance  in determining  the  economic
effects  of the  windfall.
Government policy  further extends to  import protection, price
control,  investment  control,  and other measures  affecting  relative  prices.
Import  controls,  in particular,  will contribute  to the  rise in the price  of
goods purchased  by primary  producers,  increasing  the transfer  of purchasing
power  to  elsewhere  in the  economy.
Finally,  there  will  be cyclical  effects. In the  presence  of capacity
limitations,  the  boom  will  generate  an inflationary  process. This  may  not  be- 4 -
fully  reversed AFter  the boom ends, because  of downward  rigidities  in wages
and  prices  leading  to  unemployment  (Gelb,  1988).
Experience  of  Countries  with  Temporary  Windfalls
OPEC after  1973  was widely  regarded  as having  occasioned  a permanent
windfall  for  oil  producers  as there  were  no expectations  for  a reversal  of the
quadrupling  of oil prices that occurred.  This may explain  that the Dutch
disease  literature  largely  deals  with oil  and  natural  gas,  whose  price  follows
that  of oil.
In turn,  coffee  in 1976-78  was an archetypical  case of a temporary
windfall.  It was  generally understood that the  price of  coffee rose
substantially  because of a  frost in Brazil  and that it would subsequently
decline again  (Beven, Collier, and  Gunning, 1987, p.  409).  Similar
considerations  apply  to  cocoa.  These  commodities are,  therefore, of
considerable  interest  for  our  subject.
The  following discussion pertains to  the  experience of  four
countries,  Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Colombia, in the 1976-78
period. All  of them  are  coffee  producers;  the  first  two  are  also producers  of
cocoa. In  each  case,  production  is largely  exported.
Price increases  varied  among the four countries,  depending  on the
relative  importance  of the arabica  and the robusta  varieties  in the case of
coff i,  the role of long-term  contracts  in the  case of cocoa,  and the  timing
of  sales for  both commodities.  At  the  same time, cocoa prices rose
considerably  less  than  coffee  prices.
Taking  1975  as 100,  the  average  price  index  for  coffee  in the  1976-78
period  was as follows:  Cameroon  228, C8te d'Ivoire  227, Kenya 279, and
Colombia  288.  The corresponding  indices  for cocoa  were 154  for  Cameroon  and
178  for  the  Ivory  Coast  (Table  1).Table  1
Changes  in Export  Prices,  Volume,  and  Values,  1976-78
(1975  =  100)
Price  Volume  Value
Cameroon  coffee  228  84  191
cocoa  154  82  127
C6te  d'Ivoire  coffee  227  99  225
cocoa  178  119  212
Kenya  coffee  279  128  356
Colombia  coffee  288  78  224
Source: Davis  (1983)
Note: Volume  figures  have  been  corrected  so as to  establish  consistency  with
the  value  and  the  price  figures,  which  have  been  considered  to provide
primary  observations.-6-
At the same time,  coffee  export  volume  increased  to a considerable
extent in Kenya while declining in Cameroon and Colombia and  remaining
practically  unchanged  in C8te  d'Ivoire. Also,  there  was  an increase  of cocoa
export  volume  in COte  d'Ivoire  and a decline  in Cameroon. All in all,  Kenya
experienced  the largest increase  in export values,  with an index of 356,
followed  by Colombia  with 224.  The figures  for the  other  two  countries  were
225 for coffee  and 212 for  cocoa  in C6te  d'Ivoire  and 191  for coffee  and 127
for  cocoa  in  Camerotn  (Table  1).
The next question  concerns  the distribution  of the proceeds  of the
windfall.  In Kenya, these accrued almost entirely  to the producers.  In
Colombia,  the producers  got more than one-half  and the stabilization  fund  of
the Coffee Federation  more than one-third,  leaving only one-tenth  to the
government  in the form of export taxes.  In Cameroon,  the share of the
producers  was less than  two-fifths,  compared  with approximately  one-fifth  for
the  government,  and  more than  one-third  for  the  stabilization  fund. Finally,
while  the  government's  share  did  not reach  one-tenth,  the  stabilization  fund
had  more than  one-half  of the  proceeds,  leaving  one-third  to the  producers  in
Cote  d'Ivoire  (Table  2) 11
This primary  distribution  was  modified,  howeve:,  by taxes  other  than
those  levied  on exports  as wall as by the  transfer  to the  government  of some
of the  funds  that accrued  to commodity  organizations. The question  arises,
then,  how  the  budgetary  position  of the  individual  governments  was  affected  by
these  additional  receipts.
1/ The  data  do not  always  add  up to 100.^  11  -
the expansion  of the  monetary  base  accelerated,  contributing  to inflationary
pressures.
The experience  of the four countries  indicates  that the economic
effects  of a windfall  are importantly  influenced  by the government  policies
applied.  To  begin with, the policies  determine  the distribution  of the
windfall.  Furthermore,  changes in  relative  prices are  affected by  the
mcasures  of protection  applied. At the same time,  government  spending  might
aggravate  the effect  of the windfall  and may continue  after it has ended.
Finally,  the response  of the monetary  authorities  to an externally-induced
increase  in  the  monetary  base  will  affect  the  rate  of inflation.
Arguments  for  Compensation  Arrangements
Several arguments  have been put forward  for the establishment  of
schemes  that  would  mitigate  fluctuatisns  in export  prices  and  export  earnings
in developing  countries. In this  connection,  the  first  question  is if  export
ptLce  changes  are  exogenous  to the  country  concerned  since  onl; in this  event
will  export  earnings  move in  a parallel  fashion. Such  will  not  be the  case if
the  country  in  question  can  affect  world  mariet  prices;  now,  changes  in supply
conditions  will bring  about price  changes  that will not parallel  changes  in
export  earnings.
Excluding  this  possibility  for the time  being,  we will consider  the
arguments  for  earnings  stabilization  for  a major  staple. The  assumption  will
be made  throughout  that  export  sales  account  for  practically  all sales  of the
product  in question,  so that  domestic  sales  can  be neglected. Institutional
aspects  of stabilization  will  be left  to  a later  stage.
The first  argument,  basic  to the  Dutch  disease  literature  and  made in
the  Chile  loan document,  is that  increases  in export  earnings  in the  booming- 12  -
sector  will lead to a deterioration  of the competitive  position  of other
traded  goods industries. In the present  context  of temporary  windfalls,  an
offsetting  change  will eventually  occur,  however. Also,  the  initial  shock  may
be unfavorable,  involving  a fall in prices,  as was the  case for  most primary
products  in  the  early  1980s.
Symmetry  will  now call  for  interventions,  irrespective  of  whether  the
initial  shock  was favorable  or unfavorable. In the  latter  case,  a temporary
decline in export earnings  for a  major staple will lead to a  rary
depreciation  in  real  terms  that  would  give  misleading  signals  for  other  traded
productions.
A  further argument relates to  government behavior.  In  the
application  of Please's  Law, it is argued  that  governments  tend  to spend  all
increments  in  revenues. From  available  evidence,  it  further  appears  that  some
of the  spending  continues  even  after  the  original  impetus  has  died  away. This
will,  then,  create  an assymetry  in spending  decisions.  l/
Another  sort  of assymetry  pertains  to cyclical  effects. As the  boom
generates domestic expansion, capacity limitations  will  give  rise  to
inflationary  repercussions.  Owing  to downward  rigidities  in  prices  and  wages,
these may  not  be  reversed in  the event of  an  unfavorable  shock, and
unemployment  may  ensue.
We have considered  so far the effects of fluctuations  in export
earnings  on resource  allocation,  publ  r  spending,  and  the  business  cycle.  It
has further  been suggested  that fluctuations  in export  earnings  discourage
1/  James  Buchanan  would argue  that this is not necessarily  irrational  from
the political  point of view if one considers decision  making under
pressure  from  interest  groups.- 13  -
savings  and  investment,  thereby  reducing  long-term  incomes.
Empirical studies  do not, however,  support the claim that export
instability  would  reduce savings and  investment (MacBean, 1966; Moran,
1983).  In fact,  the argument  has been  made that  the  opposite  conclusion  may
ensue as the precautionary  motive leads to increased  savings  when export
earnings  fluctuate  (Knudsen  and  Parnes,  1975).
Finally,  reference  has been  made to adverse  microeconomic  effects  of
price fluctuations  on producers.  An authoritative  study showed,  however,
these  effects  to  be small  (Newbury  and  Stiglitz  1981). At any  rate,  it can  be
assumed  that  producers  act  rationally  and  will  make  adjustments  in production
in  response  to fluctuations  in prices.
In  contradistinction to  much  of  the  literature  on  price
stabilization,  this discussion  focused  on the macroeconomic  rather  than the
microeconomic  effects of export price fluctuations.  These effects will
operate even  if  producers are  acting racionally,  so  that microeconomic
efficiency  is  ensured.
Firstly,  producers  of other  commodities  will  respond  in  a symmetrical
fashion to changes in relative  prices that may be generated  directly or
indirectly,  through  the  exchange  rate  mechanism,  by fluctuations  in the price
and earnings  of a major staple.  These changes  are considered  undesirable
because  they  do not  conform  to the  country's  comparative  advantage  but  rather
respond  to temporary  factors.
Furthermore,  there  are  assymetries  that  operate  in the  macroeconomy,
notwithstanding  rational  actions by producers.  These relate to ratchet
effects  in government  spending  as full reversability  is often not assured
following  increases  in revenues  derived  from  higher  price  of a major  staple.- 14  -
Assymetries  arise also in the course  of the business  cycle  due to capacity
limitations  and  downward  rigidities  in  price  and  wages.
It may  be concluded,  then, that reducing  fluctuations  in export
pAces  and earnings  of a major staple  would (1) limit changes  in relative
prices  between  traded  and  nontraded  goods  (real  exchange  rates);  (2)  avoid  an
increase  in the  spending  stream  of the  government  when  prices  are  high,  which
may not be fully reversible,  and (3) moderate  the adverse effects  of the
business  cycle.  Among these  arguments,  (1) is symmetrical  while (2)  and (3)
are  assymetrical.
In the  discussion. t  has been  assumed  that  changes  irn  export  prices
originate  in the world  martat  and do not affect  the domestic  supply  of the
staple.  In this event,  export  prices  and earnings  change  proportionately,
unless output  responds  to price changes  that may be neglected  without  much
loss  of tealism  in  the short  run.
But how about cases when price changes  originate  in sudden  supply
shifts  in the country  concerned  as was the  case  of coffee  in Brazil  referred
to earlier?  Now, stabilizing  prices  may destadilize  export  earnings  since
compensating  changes in quantities  ant prices would not be permitted to
operate. Thus,  if a shortfall  of supply  causes  prices  to rise,  interventions
that lower  prices  would  also lower  export  earnings,  thereby  aggravating  the
situation  of the  producers  of the  staple.
Apart from  Brazilian  coffee,  however,  there  are few  cases,  including
Saudi  oil and Bangladesh  jute,  where  a country  would  dominate  world supply.
In other  cases,  an adjustment  may be made in the  decision  rules  in order  to
allow  for  price  changes  caused  by shifts  in the  country's  own  supply.- 15  -
If  supply  changes can  be  neglected, the  problem remains  if
governments can  appropriately forecast prices  that  is  necessary for
intervention  to  be stabilizing.  As Peter  Bauer  (1954)  first  noted  over  thirty
years  ago, this  presupposes  that  governments  can foresee  price  trends  in the
world market. 1/  Given the importance  of this issue,  it deserves  separate
consideration.
Forecasting  Prices
If compensation  schemes involving  a particular  commodity,  such as
petroleum  or  coffee. are contemplated  in several  countries,  it would be
appropriate  to use a common  forecast  in all  the  countries  in question. This
would  avoid  each  country  incurring  a considerable  expense  in  making  forecasts
and, if several  forecasts  are  used,  only  one of them  may  be correct. The  use
of  international  forecasts  would also avoid thc problem, often found in
developing  countries, that prices are  set overly low so as to generate
government  revenue  under  the  guise  of price  stabilization.
One may  then consider using a  price forecast by  international
organizations,  in the particular  case the  World  Bank.  This,  in turn,  raises
the  question  of the  Bank's  experience  with  price  forecasting.
Comparisons  with  other  organizations  show  that  the  World  Bank's  price
forecasts  for 1983-85  were superior  to those of the Bank of America and
Wharton Econometric  Forecasting  Associates  and were of similar  quality  as
1/  "As all long-term  price  changes  begin  as short-term  movement,  it is not
possible  to say until well after the event  whether  a particular  price
change  was  a short-term  fluctuation  or phase  of  a long-term  change. Thus,
unless they are  hedged about with specific  safeguards,  stabilization
measures  may easily  result  in a loss  of contact  with the  trend"  (Bauer,
1954,  p.  274).- 16 -
those  of the International  Monetary  Fund.  In the  latter  case,  the  continued
exchange  of information  may  have  contributed  to the  similarity  of the  results.
At the same  time,  there  appears  to be a tendency  towards  optimistic
forecasts  by the Bank.  In particular,  forecasters  retained  their optimism
after the 1973-74  and 1978-79  commodity  price  booms (Castelli  and Kanem,asu,
1985,  pp.  41 and  60). More  generally,  "forecasters  did  not  respond  adequately
to economic events during the period in which the forecasts  were made,
inasmuch  as these events  had an impact  on prices in the target  year.  It
appears that the forecasters  were rather insensitive  to current economic
conditions  and their  impact  on the future  and tended  to maintain  their  past
forecasts  until the need for changes became  compellingly  obvious (Duncan,
1986,  p. 5).
The  la:ter  point  is  exemplified  by World  Bank  forecasts  for  petroleum
prices. In 1979,  when  the  first  World  Development  Report  was  prepared,  it  was
projected  that petroleum  prices  would  remain  constant  in real terms. In the
final  printing,  a footnote  was added:  "The basic set of projections  made
before  the oil price increases  of July 1, 1979  assume  that  petroleum  prices
would  remain  at their  average  level  for the period  1975-78. Clearly,  future
projections  will have  to take  account  of the  recent  price  increases  and  their
repercussions"  (World  Development  Report,  1979,  p. 10).
Following this  second oil  shock, World  Bank  petroleum price
projections  were  modified,  assuming  an average  annual  increase  of 3 percent  in
real  terms  that  did not materialize. Nor  has the  steep  decline  in petroleum
prices  in  1986  been  foreseen  in  Bank  forecasts.
In view of  errors in price forecasts  one  should  not make full
adjustment  for deviations  of the actual export price from the reference- 17 -
price.  This is the case,  for example,  under  the  Chilean  Income  Compensation
Fund when no adjustment  is made within  a certain  limit,  partial  adjustment
within  a band  of price  differences,  and full  adjustment  for  changes  exceeding
the  band.
In practice,  the band may be set  rather  wide.  This will limit  the
danger of acting on erroneous price forecasts  and reduce the extent of
government  interventions. At the same time, the adverse  effects  of large
price  fluctuations  will  be  mitigated.
Institutional  Issues
Take first the  case where a  staple, subject to a  compensation
arrangement, is  produced by  a  government enterprise.  Under  such  an
arrangement,  the  enterprise  should  pay (receive)  compensation  to (from)  a fund
established  for this purpose.  Payments  to (from)  the fund should  not enter
the regular foreign exchange holdings of the Central Bank, the money supply,
or the  government  budget.
This would involve  sterilizing  flows  that represent  the difference
(or  part  of the  difference)  between  the  export  price  and the  reference  price
as far  as the foreign  exchange  market  and the  money supply  is  concerned  while
keeping  the amounts  concerned  outside  the budgetary  process.  One may thus
avoid  that  external  shocks  affect  the  exchange  rate,  tb'  money  supply,  and  the
government  budget.
The described  procedure  corresponds  to that applied  in Chile.  In
Cameroon,  a  more complicated  procedure  has been used, with part of the
petroleum  revenue  deposited  in overseas  accounts  and subsequently  transferred
to  extrabudgetary  accounts.- 18  -
While  copper  in  Chile  and  petroleum  in Cameroon  are  largely  produced
by state  enterprises  1-,  the  production  of coffee  and  cocoa  is  carried  out in
a large  number  of small  private  enterprises.  It  has  been suggested  that  price
fluctuations  may be reduced through the purchases  and sales of marketing
boards  that accumulate  stocks  in the event  of high prices  and reduce  stocks
when prices  are  low.  Such  boards  operate  in the  anglophone  countries  of Sub-
Saharan  Afi  .a. 2/
The marketing  boards interfere,  however,  in private commerce  and
their operation  is costly.  Apart from administrative  costs,  the cost of
operation includes the  expense involved in  investing scarce capital in
inventories,the  cost of stockage,  as well as wastage in stockage.  Also,
marketing  boards have often been used to generate revenue for political
ends.  Thus,  in Nigeria  the  board  is said  to have  served  "the  needs  of ruling
parties,  governments  and the Northern  aristocracy  to expand  and consolidate
networks  of patronage'  (Williams,  1985,  p. 13).
Reductions  in price and earnings  fluctuations  do not require  the
establishment  of  marketing boards  but  can  be  done  as  a  financial
transaction. This is the case in the francophone  countries  of Sub-Saharan
Africa  where the stabilization  funds establish a reference  price for the
1/  In Chile,  21 percent  of production  originates  with private  firms  that  do
not  come under the compensation  fund;  in Cameroon  the foreign  operating
companies  have 30 pezcent  of production  and make royalty  and profit  tax
payments  to the  budget.
2/  For an early discussion  of marketing  boards, see FAO, 1962.  Recent
discussions  are  in  Abbott  (1985)  and  Arhin,  Hesp,  and  van  der  Laan  (1985);
the latter  also examines  the operations  and the subsequent  demise of
marketing  boards  in  two  francophone  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  Senegal
and  Upper  Volta.- 23  -
sugar  were negatively  correlated  with fluctuations  in cocoa,  coffee,  cotton,
beef,  and  rice.  In  Kenya,  this  was  the  case  between  coffee  and  cotton  as well
as  between  cotton  and  tea  (MacBean and  Nguyen,  1987,  pp.  140-1).
Nevertheless,  the  quantitative  impact of  these compensating  changes is
relatively  small.
The next question  concerns  the instability  of the prices of the
various commodities  that loom  large  in  the  exports of  the  developing
countriejs.  Instability  indices have been calculated  with  reference to
deviations  from  a trend.  They are shown  in Table  5 for  the  periods  1951-60,
1961-70,  and 1971-80  as well  as for  the  entire  1951-80  period  combined.
While there are differences  among the three ten-year  periods, a
rather clear picture emerges.  Sugar  shows by  far  the  largest price
instability,  followed  by coffee,  cocoa,  and copper,  with small differences
among  them.  At the other  end of the spsctrum,  there  has  been limited  price
instability  in  re8ard  to  tea,  cotton,  tobacco,  and  bananas.
Petroleum  represents  a  special  case, inasmuch  as petroleum  prices
were stable in the postwar period  until 1973, quadrupled  in 1973-74,  and
tripled  in 1979-80. Extending  our  horizon  to 1987  would  increase  the
instability  of petroleum  prices further,  given the decline by one-half  in
nominal  terms  that  occurred  in  recent  years.
It follows  that  petroleum  may  be included  with sugar,  coffee,  cocoa,
and  copper  as  commodities  having  high  price  instability.  At the  same  time,  as
we have seen,  these  commodities  loom large  in the  exports of the developing
countries.
Further interest  attaches  to the share of merchandise  exports in
GDP.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  higher  this  share,  the  greater  will  be the fiscal- 24 -
Table  5
Instability  Indices l/for  Product  Prices  2/
1951-80  1951-60  1961-70  19T1-80
Coffee  39.7  19.4  10.8  41.6
Cotton  i3.9  4.4  4.0  14.3
Copper  35.7  20.6  17.9  21.2
Sugar  66.4  18.5  62.0  67.7
Tobacco  12.6  7.3  8.0  7.0
Cocoa  37.0  23.7  18.5  29.8
Bananas  10.0  6.4  6.9  6.7
Tea  17.2  16.3  3.7  18.5
Petroleum  55.5  7.9  2.4  40.5
Source: MacBean  and  Nguyen,  1987,  p. 100  and (for  petroleum)  own  calculation.
Note:  1/  The  instability  index  has  been  defined  as  the  root  mean square
deviation  index:  n  [Xi-Xi)  IXi)2'  where Xi and Xi  ,
respectively,  are  actual  and  trend  values  in year  i.
2/  Bauxite,  fertilizer,  iron  ore,  and  wood  have  been  excluded
beca  se of  a lack  of a representative  price.- 25  -
and  monetary  effects  of export  price  instability.  Table  6 shows  these  ratios,
together  with  the  ratio  of the  largest  and  the  two  largest  exports  to GDP.
The export-GDP  ratio is the  highest  for the Democratic  Republic  of
Yemen (71.7 percent),  followed  by Mauritania  (62.3 percent),  Liberia (53.7
percent),  Congo (50.8  percent),  Malaysia  (49.4  percent),  Cote d'Ivoire  (46.6
percent),  and Mauritius  (41.1  percent)  Yemen (67.1  percent)  is also in the
lead  in terms  of the  ratio  of the  largest  export  product  to  GDP.  It is
followed  by the  Congo  (40.9  percent),  Mauritania  (34.6  percent),  Liberia  (33.4
percent),  Mauritius  (26.7  percent),  and  Guinea  (22.3  percent).
Conclusions  and  Policy  Recommendations
This  paper has  provided  macroeconomic  arguments for  the use  of
compensation  schemes.  These arguments  call for reducing  fluctuations  in
export  prices  and earnings  of a major staple,  so as to (1)  limit  changes  in
relative  prices  between  traded  and  non-traded  goods  (real  exchange  rates);  (2)
avoid  an increase  in the spending  stream  of the government  when prices  are
high,  which  may  not be fully  reversible;  and (3)  moderate  the  adverse  effects
of the  business  cycle.
Compensation  arrangements  may be established  in  developing  countries
where exports are highly concentrated,  are  subject to considerable  price
fluctuations,  and represent  a high ratio  to GDP.  This will be the case,  in
particular,  in  countries  exporting  predominantly  petroleum  and  coffee.
If  the  conditions  warrant the  establishment  of  a  compensation
arrangement,  this  may  be accomplished  by utilizing  variable  export  levies  and
segregating  the  proceeds from  the  budget and  monetary accounts.  An
appropriate  solution  may  be to set  up a separate  fund at  the  Central  Bank,  to
which the proceeds  of variable  export levies  are paid.  In this way, the
exchange  rate,  the  budget,  and  monetary  variables  will  not  be affected.TABLE6
RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF EXPORTS
TOTAL  EXPORT  RATIO  OF LARGEST  RATIO  OF TWO  LARGEST
GOP  RATIO  EXPORT  PRODUCT  TO  EXPORT  PRODUCTS  TO
COUNTRV  TOTAL  EXPORTS  GDP  TOTAL  EXPORTS  GDP
TRINIDAD  AND  TOBAGO  28.9  39.8  11.5  70.5  20.4
VENEZUELA  25.3  58.3  14.7  95.4  24.1
ALGERIA  22.4  37.8  8.5  72.5  16.2
MALAVSIA  49.4  22.6  11.2  37.0  18.3
SYRIA  8.1  49.6  4.0  65.0  5.3
JORDAN  19.8  42.6  8.4  48.2  9.5
CHILE  23.9  30.8  7.4  42.4  10.1
COLOMBIA  10.4  50.5  5.3  63.2  6.3.
COSTA  RICA  25.6  28.1  7.2  55.3  14.1
GUATEMALA  8.8  32.4  2.9  40.4  3.6
ECUADOR  18.2  E2.8  11.4  70.4  12.8
CONGO  50.8  80.6  40.9  86.2  43.8
MAURITIUS  41.1  64.9  26.7  67.2  27.6
PERU  20.9  18.9  4.0  36.0  7.5
JAMAICA  27.0  64.0  17.3  69.9  18.9
PARAGUAV  6.9  39.2  2.7  69.6  4.8
EL SALVADOR  11.8  58.3  6.9  61.4  7.3
CAMEROON  29.2  55.0  16.1  67.3  19.6
NIGERIA  17.1  94.7  16.2  96.1  16.6
DOMINICAN  REP.  15.8  42.5  6.7  54.2  8.6
NICARAGUA  10.6  35.5  3.8  68.3  7.2
HONDURAS  22.4  36.1  8.1  59.6  13.4
ZIMBABWE  22.2  25.5  5.7  34.0  7.5
PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA  39.7  48.8  19.4  62.0  24.6
COTE  D'IVOIRE  46.6  31.8  14.8  56.3  26 3
EGYPT  8.0  38.9  3.1  53.9  4.3
YEMEN  0.5  68.1  0.3  76.7  0.4
VEMEN  OEM.  71.7  93.6  67.1  94.8  67.9
INDONESIA  21.8  50.4  11.0  66.5  14.5
LIBERIA  53.7  62.1  33.4  82.5  44.3
BOLIVIA  9.9  55.7  5.5  75.9  7.5
MAURITANIA  62.3  55.6  34.6  95.7  59.6
UGANDA  . 93.6  . 96.4
LAO.  POR  . 30.0  . 38.3
CHAD  21.7  53.6  11.6  88.8  19.3
ZAMBIA  21.1  85.4  18.0  88.0  18.6
SRI LANKA  22.3  43.2  9.6  52.2  11.6
GHANA  9.6  52.8  5.1  74.2  7.2
SENEGAL  20.5  23.7  4.9  40.2  8.2
SIERRA  LEONE  17.1  22.2  3.8  41.6  7.1
GUINEA  23.5  95.0  22.3  97.5  22.9
SUDAN  5.4  25.7  1.4  45.2  2.4
TANZANIA  4.6  35.8  1.6  46.5  2.1
KENYA  16.7  25.4  4.2  45.9  7.6
SOMALIA  3.7  76.5  2.8  89.7  3.3
RWANDA  7.6  81.8  6.2  88.8  6.8
CENTRAL  AFRICAN  REP  18.9  34.9  6.6  44.4  8.4
BENIN  15.8  42.8  6.8  51.5  8.1
MADAGASCAR  11.7  35.9  4.2  65.9  7.7TABLE 6  (CONT'D)
RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF EXPORTS
TOTAL  EXPORT  RATIO OF  LARGEST  RATIO  OF TWO  LARGEST
GDP  RATIO  EXPORT  PRODUCT  TO  EXPORT  PRODUCTS  TO
COUNTRY  TOTAL  EXPORTS  GOP  TOTAL  EXPORTS  GOP
TOGO  34.6  51.1  17.7  68.8  23.8
BURUNDI  9.7  74.6  7.2  76.6  7.4
SURMA  5.0  30.9  1.5  47.5  2.4
ZAIRE  32.2  38.1  12.3  56.2  18.1
MALAWI  21.2  51.4  10.9  71.2  15.1
MALI  15.6  49.3  7.7  54.4  8.5
BURKINA  FASO  6.8  54.7  3.7  69.3  4.7
ETHIOPIA  6.9  61.9  4.3  77.8  5.4
1- 28  -
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